Saturday, January 23, 2010

Warnings surrounding the impending Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline deal

Found some important news in the Iranian press today that needs additional discussion.

Iran, Pakistan to sign gas pipeline deal ‘next week’

Press TV,

Thursday, 21st January, 2010.

Pakistani Federal Minister for Petroleum Naveed Qamar has declared that Iran and Pakistan have finalized an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline.

Qamar said the federal government is taking serious measures to combat the current energy crisis in the country.

He noted that the two countries will sign an accord on the pipeline next week, Dawn newspaper reported on Wednesday.

The Pakistani minister’s remarks come as the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke had earlier urged Islamabad to avoid the deal with Iran.

Holbrooke said the US would help Pakistan secure liquefied natural gas supplies, should it abandon the planned gas deal with Iran.

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As I have repeated on this blog several times, an Iran-Pakistan pipeline deal is of key importance for countries in the region. Firstly, such a deal greatly increases Pakistan’s energy security and represents an opportunity for the country to overcome its domestic energy shortages. This deal is a great political and economic boon for Iran and will vastly increase their regional influence. The pipeline can be extended into China, who has expressed great interest in such a deal. For China, a natural gas pipeline from Iran via Pakistan means increased energy security via reduced reliance on vulnerable sea transports from the Middle East and Africa. It also means co-dependence on Iran and Pakistan for its energy needs and a key interest in the political security of those nations.

For these reasons, such a pipeline does not fit in with the long-term geopolitical strategy of the U.S. and will be heavily opposed. Consequently, expect significantly increased actions by the U.S. against Pakistan and Iran to disrupt this deal over the coming months. Efforts to destabilize Pakistan will likely significantly increase. Mostly this will be more of the same – internal disruption via mobilization of insurgent groups against the Pakistani government. We will see many more (1) al-Qaeda-like terrorist attacks that destabilize the country and promote civil war conditions, (2) agitation against the Pakistani government amongst militant Islamic groups such as when the CIA run al-Qaeda, blamed the Pakistani government for crimes it committed, (3) predator drone attacks which do nothing but stir up resistance and recruit people for the Taliban. Imperial overstretch means that conventional war (i.e. boots on the ground) is probably not possible between the U.S. and Pakistan. Therefore, be on the lookout for any attempts to play India off against Pakistan. Though any such action would have an incredibly slim chance of success and in the short term would actually stabilize Pakistan by galvanizing Pakistani patriotism, such an action could feasibly be attempted in order to use India as a stooge to diminish the strength of the Pakistani military. While this would inevitably create resistance to India amongst the various Islamic and tribal factions, a diminished military would increase the possibility over time that the various tribal and Islamic groups may try to seize power in Pakistan and end up Balkanizing the nation.

The U.S. does seem to want to avoid a conventional war with Iran, so I am predicting covert, rather than overt actions in that country (though Israel can always throw a spanner in the works at any time by unilaterally bombing Iran). The strategy regarding Iran will be to resurrect the Mousavi faction. Due to the inherent risk of blowback in Iraq, these actions will be less extreme compared to what can be done in Pakistan. I would expect to see increased efforts in Iran to get rid of the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime in order to kill the pipeline deal. There will be: (1) more disruption from the Mousavi faction (he might even be killed to spark mass unrest), (2) more cross-border terrorist attacks from Pakistan like last October’s suicide bombing of Revolutionary Guard commanders by U.S. funded group, Jundullah, (3) more internal terrorism from MKO etc during protests. Basically, anything to elicit a violent domestic response and cause further destabilization that does not provoke an Iranian response in Iraq.

If any significant escalation in covert activity within these two countries eventuates in the next few months, we will know who the real culprits are and the reasons behind their attacks.

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